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Assigning Protection: Can Refugee Rights and State 
Preferences be Reconciled? 
by 
James C. Hathaway* 
 
The theoretically global responsibility to protect refugees is today heavily 
skewed, with just ten countries – predominantly very poor – hosting more than 
half of the world’s refugee population. Refugee protection has moreover become 
tantamount to warehousing for most refugees, with roughly half of the world’s 
refugees stuck in “protracted refugee situations” for decades with their lives on 
hold. Both concerns – the unprincipled allocation of responsibility based on ac- 
cidents of geography and the desperate need for greater attention to resettlement 
as a core protection response – cry out for a global, managed system to protect 
refugees. 
Keywords: refugees, asylum, burden sharing, preference matching, international 
administration 
JEL classification code: F00, F02, F53, F55, J60, K33, K37, K38 
 
The international refugee regime presents a conundrum. On the one hand, 149 
countries have formally assumed a common duty to recognize and protect refugees 
in line with the requirements of international law – including respect for a common 
definition, and ensuring refugees a common catalog of rights.1 But in practice, just 
ten – mostly quite poor – countries host more than half of the world’s refugees.2 
Less than 15 % of refugees are living in all of the countries of the developed world 
combined (UNHCR, 2017, p. 2). Put simply, resources are presently inversely cor- 
related with protection responsibilities.3 
 
* James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law and Director, Program in Refugee 
and Asylum Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (MI), USA; Distinguished Visiting 
Professor of International Refugee Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
1 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 2545, done July 28, 
1951, entered into force April 22, 1954 (Refugee Convention). The definition of a 
refugee is contained in Art. 1, and the rights owed to refugees are found in Arts. 2–34. 
For a list of state parties, see http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/ 
states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html, accessed October 30, 2018. 
2 The top ten refugee-hosting countries are (in order) Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, 
Lebanon, Iran, Germany, Ethiopia, Jordan, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo 
(UNHCR, 2018a, p. 9). 
3 The ten countries that host the most refugees relative to their “fair share” are (in 
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This mismatch between capacity and responsibilities is in part the product of 
accidents of geography: most refugees originate in the less developed world  and 
for mainly logistical reasons seek protection in  neighboring  states.4  But even  if 
the skewed distribution of protection responsibilities is in this sense “natural,” the 
specter of a theoretically global responsibility being assumed de facto by a small 
minority of comparatively disadvantaged states raises concerns about interstate eq- 
uity. That case is made stronger by the fact that wealthier countries have for many 
years pursued a variety of non-entrée policies intended to bar refugees from ac- 
cessing their territory (see Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 2015), thereby ex- 
acerbating the challenges faced by poorer states.5 
This is not to say that intraregional asylum is a bad thing for most refugees. To 
the contrary, there is a greater likelihood  of cultural  and functional  compatibility 
of the kind that enables refugees more quickly to get back on their feet, meeting 
their own needs and even contributing to the welfare of their host communities.6 
This both avoids the prospect of debilitation and reduces the cost of providing asy- 
lum. Equally important, proximity to the country of origin facilitates the ability of 
refugees to go home. Making it easier for refugees to go home if and when condi- 
tions allow replenishes asylum capacity, thus aligning with the preferred outcome 
of the refugee regime.7 This is particularly important given that the main countries 
of asylum have typically faced recurring refugee arrivals. 
Given the advantages of protection closer to home, Alex Betts and Paul Collier 
(2017) have recently proposed a creative model for enhancing refugees’ economic 
autonomy in ways that enable them to serve as engines for development in poorer 
host states. Their vision is oriented to reinvigorating asylum by shifting the locus of 
resources and attention to the less developed world. Regional host states would both 
order) Jordan, Lebanon, Tanzania, Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Venezuela, 
and Algeria (Reynolds and Vacatello, 2017). 
4 The top ten refugee countries of origin are (in order) Syria, Afghanistan, South Su- 
dan, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Central African Repub- 
lic, Eritrea, and Burundi (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 8). 
5 It has been argued that causal responsibility, moral responsibility, capacity, and com- 
munity are all factors relevant to determining the existence of a remedial responsibility 
(Miller, 2001). 
6 “In four-fifths of the world, state borders are the result of the legacies of colonialism. 
People across borders often have as much in common as that which divides them: lan- 
guage, culture, and extended family networks, for example [:::] There are often historic, 
ethnic and linguistic overlaps and cultural affinities. And the legal frameworks that apply 
to their own citizens on employment and certification are usually well suited to what is re- 
quired for refugees to earn a living: the regulatory problem is exclusion, not mis-design” 
(Betts and Collier, 2017, pp. 133–135). 
7 Under Arts. 1(C)(5–6) of the Refugee Convention, refugee status ends when there 
is a fundamental change of circumstances that restores protection. While it cannot be 
assumed that all refugees prefer this result (see, e.g., Kainz and Buxton, 2017), there is 
evidence that most do. For example, a recent survey of more than 1100 Syrian refugees 
conducted by Professors Kristin Fabbe (Harvard), Chad Hazlett (UCLA), and Tolga Sin- 
mazdemir (Bogazici) determined that some 90 % planned to return to Syria when the war 
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keep their borders open and discourage onward movement of refugees in return for 
a solid system of international financing, private-sector investments, and interstate 
trade concessions. They argue that under such a system refugee autonomy can be 
dramatically enhanced, drawing on compelling test pilot programs in Jordan and 
Uganda. They also sketch an innovative plan in which the same market-based ideas 
can be applied to stabilize the refugees’ countries of origin, thereby both enabling 
repatriation and averting future displacement. 
Despite its many strengths, Betts  and  Collier’s  model  has one  major  flaw: it 
is likely to leave many refugees stuck in a situation of indefinite temporariness. 
Although they appear to agree that respect for the psychosocial needs of refugees 
demands that there be a 5-year switch point at which time interim protection gives 
way to a permanent solution,8 they offer no concrete plan to ensure this outcome. 
This is a problem because recent history suggests that only about one-fourth of 
refugees will be able to reestablish themselves in their country of origin  within 
that time frame.9 Providing host countries with the investment and markets they 
need as a reward for respecting refugee rights (as Betts and Collier advocate) may 
also enhance the prospects for an alternative solution – local integration.10 But even 
if – and this is a very optimistic if – another one-fourth of refugees could be offered 
local integration by the 5-year switch point, that still leaves about half of the world’s 
refugees who would under their model be left without a durable solution. 
The likely scenario is that the millions of refugees unable  either to go home or 
to integrate locally by the 5-year switch point would join the ranks of what the 
United Nations refers to as persons in “protracted refugee situations”11 – meaning 
that they have been kept in limbo for at least 5 years, with no solution in sight. 
 
 
8 Betts and Collier (2017, p. 121), though they later suggest that the switch point could 
be “between five and ten years” (p. 205). 
9 The statistical analysis is necessarily approximate. In the time frame 1998–2007, an 
average of 1.14 million refugees returned to their home country each year (Bradley, 2013, 
p. 3). But over both a longer (1974–2013) and more  recent (2003–2013)  time frame, 
the average number of returns per annum has been 650,000–700,000 (UNHCR, 2015, 
pp. 49–50). Taking the average of the latter two statistics – 675,000 returns per annum – 
and mapping that onto the most recent statistic for new  refugee arrivals of 3.4 million  
in 2016 (UNHCR, 2017) suggests that about 20 % of refugees are likely to reestablish 
themselves in their country of origin. 
10 For example, when affirmative steps such as providing refugees with access to land 
and markets were taken, “[r]efugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia have experi- 
enced considerable success in local integration, especially when compared to most of the 
countries in the desk review portion of this evaluation” (U.S. Department of State, 2014, 
p. 30). But see Howden, Patchett, and Alfred (2017). 
11 UNHCR has defined a “protracted” refugee situation as “one in which refugees find 
themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, 
but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain un- 
fulfilled after years of exile” (UNHCR, 2004, p. 1); a “major protracted refugee situation” 
involves 25,000 or more refugees, has lasted more than 5 years, and shows no prospect of 
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The prospect of millions of people forced to put their lives indefinitely on hold12 – 
many “warehoused” in camps – is a disaster at the personal, economic, and political 
levels. It is also a disaster that can – and in my view, should – be avoided by 
integrating a broad optic on sharing responsibility in a reformulation of the refugee 
protection regime. 
Yet Betts and Collier do not advocate a meaningful duty to resettle refugees, con- 
signing refugee resettlement to be only “a relatively minor component” (Betts and 
Collier, 2017, p. 212) of the responsibility of wealthier extraregional countries. In 
taking this position, they posit no real shift from the status quo under which extrare- 
gional states engage in resettlement at their discretion and to the extent they wish. 
The result has been that an average of fewer than 100,000 refugees are resettled 
each year, less than 0.5 % of the total number of refugees in the world.13 While the 
most obvious consequence of this failure to pitch in is to exacerbate the demands 
on poorer countries, these states not infrequently effectively pass those costs along 
to refugees in the form of denials of refugee rights. Not only are frustrated and 
overtaxed poorer states increasingly  emulating the deterrent practices of wealth-  
ier countries, but denials of even the most basic refugee rights – to freedom of 
movement, the work, to educate their children – are regrettably rampant even when 
refugees are allowed to enter.14  Focusing  on resettlement  as a core component  of 
a reformulated global refugee regime is therefore not only a matter of interstate 
equity, but could also be a critical means of leveraging the dignified protection of 
millions of refugees. 
So why would Betts and Collier (2017) neglect this obvious means to realize 
their commitment to ensuring that all refugees secure a return to “pre-flight nor- 
mality” (p. 124) by the 5-year switch point? Their commitment to “working within 
the constraints of the contemporary world” (p. 234) likely convinced them that 
reform that requires powerful states to do everything presently required by inter- 
national refugee law and then adds a duty to resettle into the mix is politically 
unviable. I agree. But this links to what I see as a second flaw in their proposal: it 
“does not exclude preserving a space for asylum elsewhere” (pp. 135–136). True, 
they believe that fewer refugees are likely to travel far from home if solid protection 
is available nearby. But they insist that what they refer to as “spontaneous-arrival 
asylum” outside the region of origin be preserved “as a symbolic commitment to 
reciprocity” and “as a last resort” (p. 136). 
This combination of a token asylum system and a minor role for refugee resettle- 
ment seems clearly to amount to a very thin commitment to (human) responsibility- 
 
12 There are presently some 11.5 million refugees in protracted refugee situations; of 
these, 4.1 million have been in that situation for twenty or more years (UNHCR, 2017). 
This backlog of refugees in need of a solution will of course also require a solution, 
perhaps staggered over a decade so as not to undermine the efficacy of the reformulated 
protection system. 
13 UNHCR (2018b), noting that in 2017 only about 75,000 refugees were resettled, 
down from more than 160,000 in 2016. 
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sharing by developed countries. I believe that there is a better approach. Rather than 
making a symbolic commitment to reciprocity, extraregional countries could be 
persuaded to make a substantive commitment to sharing the responsibility to pro- 
vide protection. There is no need, however, for that contribution to take the form of 
traditional asylum adjudication and reception, nor to replicate the protection for du- 
ration of risk that is most sensibly undertaken in regions of origin. Specifically, my 
proposal is to dispense with any duty of extraregional states to process the claims  
of those arriving at their borders or to admit those arrivals found to be refugees. 
Arrival would instead lead to entry into a common international protection system 
(with the UNHCR or another agency operating a speedy, normally group-based, 
status assessment system). Those found to be refugees would be assigned and relo- 
cated to a regional state where they would receive asylum. The sharing undertaken 
by extraregional countries could instead take the form of a binding obligation to 
resettle refugees unable to go home or to be integrated locally at the 5-year switch 
point. 
Would states outside regions of origin find this an attractive option? I believe 
they would. 
Under such a system, there would be no immigration consequence from an ar- 
rival to seek protection and hence no reason for wealthy countries to spend billions 
of euros every year in a desperate effort to keep refugees away. Developed coun- 
tries crave control and manageability and have been prepared to pay massively to 
get it. For example, Australia gladly spends about C250,000 per annum to detain a 
single refugee in an offshore partner state as part of its notorious deterrence regime 
(Higgins and Tishler, 2017), while the European Union has authorized a C6 billion 
payout for Turkey to keep Syrian and other refugees from entering Europe.15 My 
point is not that we should  encourage the financing  of deterrence; to the contrary, 
it is that deterrence is very, very costly. Yet it is a cost that wealthier countries have 
been prepared to bear because they place such a high value on securing their bor- 
ders.16 Why not provide them with an alternative that achieves the same goals in a 
way that is both more cost-effective and more humane? 
Such a system would have two critical advantages over Betts and Collier’s model. 
First, a shift of this kind  would  allow  us  to  harvest  massive  sums  of  money 
that could be applied to enabling in-region asylum. OECD states (OECD, 2017) 
presently spend an average of C10,000 to process and support a single refugee for 
one year. Since an average of about 1.65 million asylum claims are presently made 
each year in OECD states,17 the cost of maintaining asylum systems in wealthy 
countries – serving less than 15 % of the world’s refugees – is an astronomical 
 
 
15 “EU and Turkey Reach Refugee Deal,” Politico, March 20, 2016. 
16 “From the perspective of states, refugee flows are chaotic, unpredictable and widely 
regarded as socially disruptive and destabilising” (Jones and Teytelboym, 2016, p. 80). 
17 In 2015, 1,661,490 asylum claims were made; in 2016, there were 1,639,940 claims 
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C16.5 billion each year.18 By way of comparison, the entire UNHCR budget that 
funds material assistance to the 85 % of refugees in the less developed world comes 
to less than 35 % of that amount.19 By not calling for the dismantling of domestic 
asylum systems in wealthier countries, Betts and Collier  have  not  only reduced 
the political viability of their model, but also sacrificed billions of euros that could 
have funded what they rightly see as the more sustainable response of in-region 
protection (Betts and Collier, 2017, p. 134). That seems to me an unconscionable 
waste. 
Second and most important, the offer to extraregional states of a role under 
which the chaos and perceived security risks of direct arrivals would be dramati- 
cally curtailed could be leveraged to secure a binding commitment from these coun- 
tries to significantly higher levels of residual resettlement for refugees at the expi- 
ration of their 5-year in-region protection  period. Specifically, the system would  
be designed to include a commitment that refugees unable to reestablish them- 
selves in their home country or to be locally integrated would, at the 5-year switch 
point, be entitled to resettle in an extraregional state. Ironically, the average num- 
ber of resettlement spots that would be needed each year is nearly identical to      
the number of asylum claims currently being processed by OECD states.20 Under 
this approach, extraregional states would remain very much engaged in (human) 
responsibility-sharing for refugees. Indeed, they would arguably be undertaking a 
more critical variant of responsibility-sharing than they do under their current in- 
dividuated asylum systems: they would be providing a desperately needed answer 
to the protracted refugee problem, harnessing their comparative advantage in pro- 
viding permanent, rather than temporary, opportunities for refugees. 
I have elsewhere sketched in some detail the full scope of such a reform.21  In 
essence, my approach is predicated on the planks of eliminating barriers to access; 
a shift to internationally run, normally group-based and hence speedy status assess- 
 
18 This is likely a conservative estimate. While states aim to process asylum claims in 
the first year, backlogs and appeals mean that procedures and hence support costs may 
extend into a second or subsequent year (ECRE, 2016). Indeed, extrapolating from data 
on costs in Germany, Betts and Collier (2017, p. 129) suggest that “the world spends 
approximately $75bn a year on the 10 % of refugees who moved to developed regions 
and only about $5bn a year on the 90 per cent who remain in developing regions.” 
19 The agency’s 2017 assistance budget was C5.72 billion per annum (based on pro- 
gram expenditures, not including global programs and headquarters costs); see http:// 
reporting.unhcr.org/financial, accessed October 30, 2018. 
20 Based on current arrivals numbers, the number requiring resettlement would be 
about 1.7 million refugees per annum, i.e., 50 % of the 3.4 million new refugees each 
year (UNHCR, 2015, pp. 49–50). This is roughly the same as the average number of 
asylum claims made in OECD countries in 2015–2016 (1.65 million per annum) (OECD, 
2018, Statistical Annex, p. 329, Table A.3). 
21 See Hathaway (2016) and, by the same author, “Responding to the Refugee Crisis,” 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/, February 29, 2016, republished in http://www.reflaw. 
org/, February 29, 2016, and in Verfassungsblog, March 1, 2016. These build on the re- 
sults of a multiyear collaborative study summarized in Hathaway (1990); social science 
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ment; no constraints on freedom of movement or other rights once an assignment to 
protection for duration of risk occurs; guaranteed funds to poorer receiving states 
(contingent on their respect for refugee rights), both to offset the costs of protection 
and to ensure development synergies between refugees and their hosts; and firm 
guarantees of access to a durable solution within 5 years. All state parties would 
commit themselves to both (financial) burden-sharing and (human) responsibility- 
sharing for refugees. Drawing on principles of common but differentiated responsi- 
bility pioneered in such fields as environment and development, different countries 
could commit themselves to different contributory mixes. But critically, all states 
would make both a financial and a human contribution to refugee protection. 
This shift would not require any renegotiation of the UN’s  Refugee Conven- 
tion; to the contrary, the reform I suggest would be a means of implementing that 
treaty, precisely as its drafters hoped would occur (Refugee Convention, Preamble, 
para. 4). International law would readily accommodate a system under which the 
place of a refugee’s arrival is divorced from the place in which he or she is pro- 
tected. So long as refugees are fairly recognized and their rights honored, a refugee 
may be required to accept asylum in a state party not of their choosing (Hathaway 
and Foster, 2014, pp. 30–49) – this is, after all, a human rights system, not a mi- 
gration regime. 
Like Betts and Collier, I believe that the only viable international reform is one 
that speaks to the self-interests of states even as it betters the lot of the world’s 
refugees – and that this proposal meets that test. 
The poorer countries that host more than 85 % of the world’s refugees would no 
longer be required to beg for the charity of wealthier states, but would be guaran- 
teed the funds needed to protect refugees. Those protection funds would not go just 
to refugees, but would also fund start-ups linking refugees to their host communi- 
ties, so that everyone benefits from the presence of refugees. And regional host 
states would not face the possibility of indefinite hosting as a perverse punishment 
for keeping their doors open to refugees. To the contrary, refugees unable safely to 
go home or for whom local integration is not possible would be resettled to another 
state. 
The system would also be better for the developed world. The assignment mech- 
anism would not only promote national security, but also undermine the smuggling 
market (since no immigration benefit would accrue from arrival in any particular 
state) and reduce the use of the refugee channel for economic migration. The more 
managed nature of the system and its focus on protection by resettlement would 
more generally give wealthier countries a role that is an easier social fit than tem- 
porary presence and give them the sort of planned, orderly role they crave. 
Most critically, the proposed system would be better for most refugees. Refugees 
would not have to put their lives on the line to get access to a place in which solid 
protection is on offer. Protection would really be the empowering, rights-regarding 
protection that the Refugee Convention calls for – not the purgatory of refugee 
camps or urban slums. And most important, every refugee would get a durable 
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The Practical Challenges. Even if I am right that such a shift is in principle mu- 
tually beneficial, it faces a number of practical challenges. 
First, there would need to be agreement on the formulae that would define a fair 
sharing of both (financial) burdens and (human) responsibilities, and that would 
ground the proposed system of common but differentiated responsibility. In par- 
ticular, and in contrast to all existing proposals, there in my view needs to be a 
disaggregation of factors that define a state’s capacity to contribute to (financial) 
burden-sharing from those relevant to the ability to receive refugees either for a 
period of years or permanently.22 
Second, assuming agreement on the formulae, there needs to be a strong central 
actor able and willing to administer the quota and assignment program. But who 
would this be? Even if states could be persuaded that there is little if any benefit    
to state-by-state management of what is fundamentally a transnational  concern,  
the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR) has shown little interest in assuming what 
would clearly be a more politically charged role that might imperil its institutional 
interests. Indeed, Betts and Collier (2017) argue that UNHCR is “not currently 
equipped” (p. 6) to manage a new refugee regime, as its institutional strengths “are 
no longer the primary skills needed to ensure refugee protection in the twenty-first 
century” (p. 38). But if not UNHCR, who might play this role? 
Third and perhaps most fundamental, a critical shift of this kind – even one not 
involving formal amendment of the Refugee Convention – requires  a champion. 
The dearth of political leadership on refugee protection at the present moment is, 
however, extreme. There have of course been moments when leaders have risen to 
the challenge of protection: Canada’s Justin Trudeau, Germany’s Angela Merkel, 
Jordan’s King Abdullah, and Tanzania’s Jakaya Kiwete come to mind. An effort to 
bridge the leadership gap – a “world refugee council” co-chaired by former leaders 
from Canada, Germany, Pakistan, and Tanzania – seemed to hold promise, but has 
thus far offered only vague directions to guide reform.23 And the failure of any 
 
22 The European Union formula adopted in September 2015 merges measures of finan- 
cial and human capacity; it is based on GDP (40 %), population size (40 %), unemploy- 
ment rate (10 %), and number of asylum applications (10 %). The latter two factors, how- 
ever, may not exceed 30 % of the population size and GDP effects (http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_MEMO-15-5698_en.htm, accessed October 30, 2018). The refugee scholar 
Atle Grahl-Madsen, the first to propose a distribution key for refugee protection, also 
merged such considerations, suggesting that a formula based on GNP 1.5/population 
was the appropriate measure (Grahl-Madsen, 1982, p. 74). The proposal circulated by 
Oxfam’s Sarnata Reynolds is perhaps the most sophisticated (though still a single for- 
mula), merging consideration of GDP with rank on both the Human Development Index 
and the Fragile States Index. The possibility of tradable quotas is discussed more gener- 
ally in Betts, Costello, and Zaun (2017, p. 57). 
23 See https://www.worldrefugeecouncil.org. In its most recent report, the Council 
limited itself to vague recommendations for increased accountability; better mobiliza- 
tion of funding; and governance reform and responsibility sharing. Only modestly more 
concretely, it did embrace the notion of refugee protection as a “common public good” 
and advocated reliance on “common but differentiated responsibility” to frame a new 
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political leader to invest his or her political capital in the UN’s current effort to  
draft a comprehensive global compact on refugees24 should surely give us pause. 
 
The Principled Challenges. Three questions about the underlying issues of prin- 
ciple arising from a proposal to abandon classical state-by-state asylum in favor of  
a managed system of global refugee responsibility sharing are typically raised. 
A first question is whether it is inherently unseemly (indeed, some might say un- 
ethical) to establish a system that would essentially distribute refugees – initially to 
safe havens and, if residual resettlement is required, to permanent home countries. 
This critique is usually framed as directed to the “commodification” of refugees 
(see, e.g., Chimni, 2007) – treating human beings as though they were bales of 
wheat to be shipped around the world. 
The most convincing riposte is, I believe, rooted in utilitarianism: while it may be 
suboptimal to structure asylum opportunities, surely this is less bad than the result 
produced by the current system under which massive resources are expended on  
the 15 % of refugees able to reach the developed world – disproportionately young, 
male, and mobile – while comparatively derisory resources are made available to 
the 85 % of refugees who remain closer to home. In particular, the fact that nearly 
12 million refugees in the global South are in protracted refugee situations – long- 
term indeterminacy, with no solution in sight – argues strongly for the importance 
of sacrificing some of the relative privilege of refugees able to reach asylum in 
wealthier states in order to do right by the massive majority of refugees consigned 
to dramatically more difficult circumstances. Put simply, the equal moral worth of 
all refugees requires that we pay as much attention to those we do not see as to 
those who are in our midst. 
Second, even if the utilitarian logic holds, ought we really to buy into a system 
that sacrifices refugee agency altogether? I find this concern quite compelling, at 
least if it is made on behalf of all refugees – not just those who make it to the 
developed world. The importance  of maximizing  refugee agency is also a matter 
of pragmatism, since, as Joris Schapendonk has recently noted, “[i]f you deprive 
refugees completely of choice, we will have a flourishing industry specialized in 
‘reintroducing’ agency, consisting of [:::] brokering service, smugglers and traf- 
fickers” (Schapendonk, 2018, p. 66). 
A promising means of maximizing refugee agency within a managed system of 
responsibility sharing is the concept of preference matching. The types of approach 
adumbrated by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2013), Jones and Teytel- 
boym (2016), and the Stanford Immigration Lab (Bansak et al., 2018) suggest that 
an algorithm could be developed that would allow refugees to have some influence 
over where they are assigned for protection. The beauty of this approach is that it 
offers the prospect of preserving efficiency – especially critical for the initial as- 
signment to protection up to the 5-year switch point when time is of the essence – 
 
24 http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/towards-a-global-compact-on-refugees.html, accessed 
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even as it enhances refugees’ own choices about the protection destination. While 
work to date has focused on preference matching as a component of local or re- 
gional systems, there seems to be no reason in principle to see the principles as 
inapplicable to, or inoperable in, the global system. 
Third, and undoubtedly most contentious, if refugees are allowed to express their 
preferences, ought the algorithm to be two-sided, allowing states (and perhaps even 
localities) of destination to express their preferences for particular qualities of a 
refugee seeking a home? The argument against doing so is perhaps obvious: there  
is a clear risk that a state might seek to avoid receiving less talented or educated 
(but equally needy) refugees, or even those with disfavored racial, political, or other 
characteristics. It seems to me, however, that there are answers to this concern. 
To start, one might strictly limit the factors a state may identify as relevant to 
matching by reference to the international legal duty of nondiscrimination. Impor- 
tantly, that duty proscribes not just direct discrimination, but also indirect (effects- 
based) discrimination25 – so, for example, a country actually motivated by race but 
defining its preference by reference to achievement of a given educational level that 
only a favored racial group can attain would still be in breach of the duty of 
nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination as a constraint is imperfect in that it requires 
a judgement call about what counts as “reasonable and objective” differentiation;26 
but it is nonetheless a norm that enjoys an especially privileged status in interna- 
tional law27 and thus is unlikely to be thought objectionable at the level of principle. 
Assuming that nondiscrimination limits the range of acceptable matching crite- ria, 
pragmatism seems to me to argue for allowing destination countries to have their 
preferences factored into a two-sided algorithm. Critically, it is likely to make the 
prospect of shifting to a managed system of protection less confronting for states. 
For example, major refugee resettlement countries already rely on referrals based 
on vetting by the UNHCR, and then apply their own selection criteria to de- cide 
which refugees within the pool of persons deemed to be in need of relocation will 
be admitted by them.28 There is, in other words, a preparedness to entrust crit- ical 
aspects of the decision-making process to an international agency because the state 
is still allowed to assess suitability for resettlement against its own metrics. 
Ensuring that destination country preferences are built into the algorithm would 
likely prove a comparable confidence-inducing measure. 
 
25 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2004, p. 148, para. 12), indicating that 
international law prohibits discrimination “in law or in fact in any field regulated and 
protected by public authorities.” 
26 As Pobjoy (2010, p. 209) observes, “[t]he ‘reasonable and objective’ standard [:::] 
should not be viewed as creating an exception to the prohibition on discrimination. Rather, 
the standard is built into the concept of discrimination itself.” 
27 It has been considered a jus cogens norm (see, e.g., Inter-American Court of Hu- 
man Rights Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of 17 September 2003, “Juridical Condition and 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants,” at 101. 
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At least as interesting, one might imagine a system in which expressed state pref- 
erences might actually facilitate a more robust and flexible form of responsibility- 
sharing. A state that has had an especially good experience with refugees from a 
given country, or that has labor market needs attuned to a particular refugee profile, 
might be willing to accept more such refugees than would be required under its 
quota.29 There could thus be a bargaining mechanism built into the responsibility- 
sharing system that would allow states to bid within their quotas, e.g., treating the 
admission of one easy-to-receive refugee as only a fraction of a quota refugee. This 
would in turn enable the supervisory agency to offer a state willing to receive a less 
easy case – for example, a disabled  refugee in need of rehabilitative  support  or   
an unaccompanied minor requiring guardianship – with a premium reflecting the 
additional contributions required of the receiving country. 
In sum, the arguments for a shift to a more managed system of refugee protection 
predicated on responsibility sharing at each of two stages strike me as compelling. 
If the practical challenges on reaching agreement on a suitable formula, empow- 
ering a supervisory agency, and garnering the political will to make the transition 
can be addressed, I see no reason in principle to persist with the present ad hoc, 
beggar-thy-neighbor system. Indeed, if designed to include a serious commitment 
to two-sided preference matching, a global refugee responsibility-sharing system 
subject to the constraint of respect for the duty of nondiscrimination seems to me  
to hold the promise of not only doing more good for more refugees, but  doing so  
in a way that is consonant with the importance of maximizing the agency of both 
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